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THE REVISION OF VIRGINIA'S JUVENILE COURT LAW
Lelia Baum Hopper*
Frank M. Slayton**
Since 1899, the year in which the state of Illinois established a
separate statutory framework for addressing the problems of chil-
dren before the courts, the juvenile justice system has been strug-
gling to establish its identity in the jurisprudence of the United
States. The juvenile court laws of this country, including those of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, have historically been based on the
doctrine of "parens patriae", which is formally defined as the
"sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability."'
According to this doctrine, the state, through the court system, can
be trusted to fulfill its obligation with respect to children with care
and solicitude and without any insistence upon a granting of consti-
tutional rights to the children who come into contact with the sys-
tem. In return for the special benefits accorded the child by the state
in the juvenile court, the child gives up certain constitutional pro-
tections. The United States Supreme Court recognized during the
late 1960's and the early 1970's that the courts and the states had
not kept up their end of the bargain made on behalf of children. The
constitutional rights of children were redefined and restored in a
series of decisions which has formed the basis of modern juvenile
court reform.
In the 1966 case of Kent v. United States2 the operation of the
juvenile justice system was first seriously questioned when the
United States Supreme Court called national attention to the fact
that the juvenile court movement had become in large part a form
without substance. The question before the court in Kent was
whether there had been a proper waiver of jurisdiction from the
juvenile court to a criminal court in the case of a sixteen year old
boy charged with housebreaking, robbery and rape. The applicable
* B.A., Westhampton College, University of Richmond, 1971; J.D., College of William and
Mary, 1974. Staff Attorney, Division of Legislative Services.
** B.S., University of Virginia, 1955; LL.B., 1958. Member of the House of Delegates,
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2. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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statute permitted waiver by the juvenile court "after full investiga-
tion." There is no doubt that the requirements enumerated in the
opinion which are applicable to juvenile courts are compelled by the
due process clause of the United States Constitution. These'require-
ments are: (1) the juvenile must be given a hearing on the matter
of waiver; (2) the juvenile's counsel must have access to the social
records of probation or similar reports which presumably are consid-
ered by the juvenile court in deciding whether to waive jurisdiction;
and (3) a statement of reasons has to be given by the juvenile court
in the event it decides to waive jurisdiction. Implicit in the require-
ment of a hearing is the need to introduce evidence and make find-
ings of fact.
In 1967, a year after Kent, the Court handed down In re Gault.3
In Gault, the Court dealt with the rights of juveniles in the adjudica-
tory phase of the juvenile court process, in which delinquency is
determined. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment due
process clause is applicable to proceedings in state juvenile courts
in an adjudication of delinquency. The decision applies in all cases
which "may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed." This new concern for the child's
right to a fair trial culminated in the Court's holding that due pro-
cess requires that juveniles be afforded the procedural rights of no-
tice, counsel, silence and cross-examination of sworn witnesses.
The Court further expanded the rights of juveniles in the case of
In re Winship' which involved a twelve year old boy who was
charged with delinquency for allegedly taking money from a
woman's purse. He was found to be delinquent upon the preponder-
ance of the evidence by the New York family court, which acts as
the juvenile court in that state. The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing: "[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against con-
viction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."' 5 There-
fore, in cases where a juvenile is charged with an offense which
would be a crime if he were an adult, proof beyond. a reasonable
doubt is required.
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
5. Id. at 364.
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The Supreme Court considered constitutional standards in the
juvenile court again when it was presented with the question as to
whether a juvenile accused of delinquency has a constitutional right
to trial by jury. This issue arose in the case of McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania.I The Court decided that trial by jury is not constitu-
tionally required in the adjudicatory phase of such a proceeding.
Many interested in the infusion of due process into the juvenile
justice system viewed this decision as a major set-back in affording
juveniles the guarantees granted adults in criminal proceedings.
The cases of Kent, Gault and Winshp, taken in conjunction have,
however, revolutionized adjudication in juvenile courts. Moreover,
this revolution is continuing in state legislatures.
Considerable attention has been given by state legislatures in the
last decade to redrafting juvenile court laws. Juvenile courts are
creatures of statute and must look to state codes for the delineation
of their powers and duties. In the past there has been a haphazard
development of the roles of the judiciary, the bar and social service
personnel in the court process. Confusion about the proper profes-
sional functions of the various individuals who are supposed to
make the juvenile justice system work has resulted from the failure
of legislatures to properly define these roles statutorily. Similarly,
neglecting to recognize the need for checks and balances in juvenile
justice legislation has contributed to criticism of the juvenile court
as being an ineffective, even unworkable, judicial system. Honoring
the procedural aspects of the constitutional mandates established
by the Supreme Court, and paying close attention to the details of
drafting clear-cut professional responsibilities, can effect substan-
tial improvement in the administration of juvenile justice.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN VIRGINIA
In 1974, the Committee Studying Services to Youthful Offenders,
a committee of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council,7 ap-
pointed a Subcommittee on Juvenile Code Revision. The subcom-
mittee was charged "to study the entirety of Chapter 8 of Title 16.1
[of the Code of Virginia] and the function of the Division of Youth
6. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-29 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
19791
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Services [of the State Department of Corrections] and to recom-
mend such changes and revisions of the law and the Division as to
it may seem proper."8 The laws governing juvenile and domestic
relations district courts operative in 1974 had not been revised as a
whole by the legislature since 1956.1 Piecemeal revision by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly during the 1960's and 1970's, which ad-
dressed the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions noted
earlier and the development of new concepts of juvenile justice, had
left Virginia's laws in a less than orderly and comprehensive form.
The Virginia Court System Study Commission established by the
1968 session of the General Assemblyl° had made significant propos-
als for the reorganization of the state's court system which were
enacted into law to a substantial degree by the 1972 session." A
uniform system of juvenile and domestic relations -district courts
was established, and provision was made for a full-time juvenile
district court judiciary by July 1, 1980.12 While the juvenile court
structure had been formalized and the requirements for judicial and
other professional staff serving the court were being upgraded by the
General Assembly by enacting a number of the Commission's rec-
ommendations, the statutes constituting the court's legal founda-
tion were not systematically organized and did not express a consis-
tent philosophy. In 1974 the time had come for the legislature to
undertake comprehensive review of these laws.
The Subcommittee on Juvenile Code Revision was given this task
and was comprised of two legislators, a circuit court judge, a juve-
nile court judge, the director of a juvenile court services unit, a
Commonwealth's attorney, a police officer assigned to a juvenile
unit, the director of services for children in the State Department
of Corrections, the state's assistant attorney general representing
juvenile court judges and the state's juvenile corrections programs,
and two attorneys in private practice. The product of this legislative
study group reflects, to a significant degree, the character of the
membership: great experience in all phases of the juvenile justice
8. S.J.Res. 17, 1974 Va. Acts at 1573.
9. 1956 Va. Acts, ch. 555, at 822.
10. S.J.Res. 5, 1968 Va. Acts at 1592.
11. COURT SYSTEM STUDY COMMISSION, HOUSE Doc. No. 6 (1972).
12. 1972 Va. Acts, ch. 708, at 963.
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system, a thorough understanding of the statutory. and case law
applicable to this system, and an appreciation of the political reali-
ties associated with successful reform of the juvenile justice system
in the Commonwealth.
Upon completion 3 of the subcommittee's work and approval of its
proposals by the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council, a compre-
hensive revision of the juvenile court laws was proposed to the 1976
Session of the General Assembly. 4 Because of the complex nature
of the legislation, the bill was carried over to the 1977 session in the
committees for Courts of Justice of the House of Delegates and the
Senate. A thorough review of the measure by the members of these
legislative standing committees during 1976 placed the bill in a
posture for favorable consideration by the 1977 legislature. 5
In revising the Virginia law on juvenile and domestic relations
district courts, certain principles were followed in order to address
the problems of troubled children and to consider the need to pro-
tect society from dangerous youth. They were: the maintenance and
support, wherever possible, of the family unit; provision of a stable
residential placement for a child who must be removed from his
home; involvement of parents in the programs designed to resolve
the difficulties of a child before the court; the need for diversion
from the court system; and the development of community-based
programs, educational opportunities and residential alternatives.' 6
The legislation conferred upon the juvenile court a greater responsi-
bility for advocating the best interests of children and for monitor-
ing these programs in which children are placed.
13. Before completion, several public hearings conducted across Virginia at the beginning
of the subcommittee's work provided opportunities to hear the views of professionals in the
criminal justice field and citizens concerned about children and the impact of juvenile crime
on the community. This hearing process was repeated upon completion of a draft proposal
in 1975 which was widely distributed to legislators, criminal justice professionals, and other
interested citizens for their study and comment. Valuable contributions were made to the
subcommittee's work by citizens who participated in the public hearings and by those who
submitted written comments. The legislative proposals were modified to reflect the concerns
of the public where the subcommittee felt it to be appropriate.
14. H.B. 518; S.B. 274 (1976) Va. General Assembly.
15. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 559, at 839.
16. VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SERVICES TO YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS: REVISION OF
THE JUVENILE CODE, SEN. Doc. No. 19 (1976).
1979]
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This article will highlight the significant changes made in Vir-
ginia statutes in 1977 which should be of interest to the attorney
practicing in the juvenile court. Amendments of particular interest
enacted during the 1978 and 1979 Sessions of the General Assembly
will also be noted.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTES
The legislation passed by the 1977 Session of the General Assem-
bly repealed Chapter 8 of Title 16.1 of the Code of Virginia and
enacted Chapter 10. The new chapter was reorganized to group
related provisions within the articles and to provide, in chronologi-
cal order, the procedures to be used in dealing with children and
adults who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The
new law made no structural changes in the existing court system or
in its auxiliary system of court services units.
A. Article 1-General Provisions
This article contains the key to understanding the philosophy and
mechanics of the remainder of the chapter. Section 16.1-227 states:
"It is the intention of this law that in all proceedings the welfare of
the child and the family is the paramount concern of the State. .."
(emphasis added). The emphasis on the welfare of the family is new
to the statement of the purpose and intent of the law and is stressed
in later statutes. 17 Another purpose set forth in this section expresses
specific concern for the child-family relationship by discouraging
the separation of the child from his family unless "the child's wel-
fare is endangered or it is in the interest of public safety."' 8 There
is also a new emphasis on the diversion from the juvenile justice
system of children whose misconduct is brought to the attention of
the court." Later statutes which detail how children may be de-
tained" and which specify particular intake procedures2- embody
this new focus of the law.
A substantially expanded section on definitions is important in
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-241(F), 16.1-279(C)(2) and (E)(3), 16.1-281 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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understanding the succeeding statutes. In section 16.1-228 three
categories of children are defined: the abused and neglected child, 2
the child in need of services and the delinquent child.24 These
categories establish distinctive tracts through the juvenile justice
system which are followed in the articles governing immediate cus-
tody, arrest, detention and shelter care; intake, petition and notice;
and disposition. An oftenheard criticism during the legislative pub-
lic hearings on the proposed revision was that the existing proce-
dures for dealing with any given: child were not always designed to
fit his particular problems, but invariably had the stigma of delin-
quency. For the child who has been abused or neglected, or who is
the subject of the court's jurisdiction because of difficulties at home
or in school which involve no violation of the criminal laws, such a
stigma is not productive.
The definition of an "abused or neglected child" and the correla-
tive procedures in the juvenile court law for serving this child corre-
spond with the comprehensive child abuse and neglect act found in
the welfare laws of the Code of Virginia which were enacted in
1975.2
A "child in need of services" includes a child who is habitually
truant, habitually disobedient, or who remains away from home or
habitually deserts or abandons his family. This definition embodies
three descriptions of unlawful behavior contained in the jurisdic-
tional section of the old law.28 The revised law narrows the tradi-
tional status offender group of offenses by tightening the definitions
and by requiring that the court make certain findings with regard
to the need for judicial intervention before jurisdiction can be as-
sumed. This latter addition to the law represents a compromise in
the legislature between two points of view as to how status offenders
should be handled by the justice system. One viewpoint would en-
tirely remove from the court all jurisdiction over status offenses on
the basis that such minor acts can be more fairly, effectively and
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(F) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(H) and (I) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
25. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 341, at 566.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158(f), (g) and (h) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (repealed 1977 Va. Acts
at 886).
1979] 853
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economically dealt with by nonjudicial agencies." Another perspec-
tive considered by the revisers contends that the juvenile court is
in a unique position to help nondelinquent children by stemming
their involvement in serious criminal activity, and the full powers
of the court should be retained over them. The compromise pro-
vides: (i) that the child's conduct must present a clear and substan-
tial danger to his life or health; or (ii) that the child or his family
needs assistance not being received, and (iii) the intervention of the
court is essential to the provision of that assistance before jurisdic-
tion can be assumed. Petitions against a child for being in need of
services should be filed only after all other community services and
resources have been exhausted.
A fourth category of behavior included in the "child in need of
services" category is the child who commits an act, which is other-
wise lawful, but which is designated a crime only if committed by
a child. This narrows the types of offenses designated delinquent
acts, and makes such offenses as violations of juvenile curfews and
drinking beer underage status offenses.
The offenses characterized as "delinquent acts" and for which a
"delinquent child" may be adjudicated are limited to those which
are also classified as crimes for adults. By clearly delineating the
acts of children which are to be classified as status offenses and as
crimes, the revisors sought to eliminate the gray areas between *de-
linquent behavior and other acts and omissions which bring a child
within the jurisdiction of the court.
New definitions included in section 16.1-228 of "adoptive home",
"foster care", "intake officer", "legal custody", "permanent foster
care placement", "shelter care" and "residual parental rights and
responsibilities" provide clarity for the procedures and dispositional
alternatives later detailed in the chapter.
27. RECTOR, PINS: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL (National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
1974); INSTITUTE OF JUDiCiAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (1977).
28. Martin, Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should Not Be Removed From the Juve-
nile Court, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 44 (1976).
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B. Article 2-Organization and Personnel
This article concerns the administration of the courts and the
court services units and is not of general interest to the practicing
attorney. The provision for a citizens advisory council found in sec-
tion 16.1-240, however, is noteworthy. The governing bodies of local-
ities which are served by court services units are permitted to ap-
point citizen advisory councils. These councils have the duty to
advise and cooperate with the court upon matters affecting children
and domestic relations; to consult with the court and director of the
court services unit on the development of the court services pro-
gram; and to designate a member of the council to visit institutions
and programs in which the court places children. This provision
consolidates two sections in the old statutes governing juvenile
courts" and continues the interest of the legislature in providing for
the positive involvement of citizens in the judicial system. Such a
citizens group can be an asset to the local juvenile court, and to the
members of the bar who practice before it, by encouraging the devel-
opment of supportive programs and overseeing the quality of justice
administered.
C. Article 3-Jurisdiction and Venue
The core of the juvenile code is section 16.1-241, jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. This statute details those instances in which a child,
parent or other adult may come within the purview of the law.
Jurisdictional authority over children is specified by age, defini-
tional category and situation of need. While "child" is defined as a
person less than eighteen years of age in section 16.1-228(D), the
jurisdiction section clarifies that this age relates to the date of the
commission of the offense. Once jurisdiction has been obtained over
a child by the court, however, such authority may be retained in
some instances until the person becomes twenty-one." The catego-
ries of children defined as abused or neglected, in need of services,
or delinquent are subject to the jurisdiction of the court for purposes
of "custody, visitation, support, control or disposition." 3' The refer-
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-157,16.1-203 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (repealed 1977 Va. Acts at 886).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-242 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
1979]
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ence to jurisdiction over proceedings involving visitation is
new-replacing an old provision which provided authority to grant
visitation privileges only to grandparents. 32 In conjunction with a
similar reference later in this same section, the court's power is
broadened to adjudicate any legitimate visitation controversy con-
cerning a child. Jurisdiction is continued from the old law over
children in situations of need where: their parents have abandoned
them;3 their custody or support is the subject of controversy or
requires determination; 34 their parents, for good cause, desire to be
relieved of their care and custody; 35 they are mentally ill or mentally
retarded and commitment or certification for treatment is sought;36
they need judicial consent for activities to which a parent would
otherwise consent ;37 judicial consent is required for emergency med-
ical treatment for the child 3 or for the sexual sterilization of a minor
who is married;39 or they require a work permit.4" In the case of
judicial consent for medical treatment, the authority of the judge
has been expanded to include consent for emergency care when the
parents fail to give such consent or provide such treatment when
requested by the judge to do so.
An important addition to the juvenile court's authority includes
jurisdiction over children who are voluntarily surre:ndered by their
parents pursuant to entrustment agreements between the parents
and public or private child-placing agencies. 41 Entrustment agree-
ments have been designed to permit parents to relinquish custody
of their children for a specified period of time without the need of
court proceedings. New statutory provisions later in the chapter,
however, require that such agreements which are effective for ninety
days or more, and which do not provide for the termination of all
parental rights and responsibilities, be approved by the court.42 This
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158.1 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (repealed 1977 Va. Acts at 886).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(D) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(D)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(H) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-277 (Cum. Supp. 1979); §§ 63.1-56, 63.1-204 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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new authority is representative of the greater responsibility placed
upon juvenile courts for monitoring the number of children entering
the foster care system and the care they receive therein. Also new
to the jurisdiction section is power over cases where termination of
residual parental rights and responsibilities is sought.,' This author-
ity will be discussed later.
Jurisdiction over adults is expanded in section 16.1-241(F) to in-
clude parents who have abused or neglected their children, who
desire to be relieved of the care and custody of their children, and
who have children who have been adjudicated in need of services or
delinquent and where the court finds the parents have contributed
to the conduct complained of against the child. This new power in
the court should be read in conjunction with other new statutory
provisions" which are intended to give the court the authority to get
at the root of the difficulties within the family structure or in the
child's misbehavior. Treatment or punishment of a child will sel-
dom be effective if the discordant home environment which precipi-
tated the need for intervention of the court is not addressed.
The authority of the juvenile court is extended to include jurisdic-
tion over petitions filed by or on behalf of a child or his parents in
order to obtain treatment, rehabilitation, or other services which are
required by law. This addition is intended to strengthen the role of
the court as an advocate for children and families, and will be more
fully discussed in the analysis of Article 9.44-1
The venue of juvenile proceedings is considered in section 16.1-
243. In cases where delinquency of a child is alleged, the proceeding
may be commenced in the county or city where the child resides,
instead of where the alleged delinquent act occurred, when the child
and the Commonwealth's attorney for both jurisdictions consent in
writing. In nondelinquency proceedings, the action is to be set in the
city or county where the child resides or where the child is present.
In the latter situation the proceedings may be transferred, after
adjudication, to the jurisdiction where the child resides.
In section 16.1-244, cases of visitation and support were added to
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(C)(2a) and (E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
44.1. See, infra, subsection I.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the matters of custody and guardianship as being subject to concur-
rent jurisdiction of the juvenile and circuit courts. While the revisers
clarified in the statute the fact that the entry of a circuit court order
in such cases divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction, they also saw
the need to empower the juvenile court to place a child temporarily
in the custody of any person, when that child has been adjudicated
abused, neglected, in need of services, or delinquent subsequent to
the entry of a circuit court order relating to the custody of the child.
D. Article 4-Immediate Custody, Arrest, Detention and Shelter
Care
Specific sections in this article detail the procedures to be fol-
lowed, and the safeguards to be observed, in taking and detaining
children in custody, and the places of permissible confinement for
different categories of children. The desire to divert children in need
of services from the criminal justice system is clearly expressed in
section 16.1-246(B). A child who is alleged to be in need of services
may be taken into immediate custody only when: (i) there is a clear
and substantial danger to the child's life or health, or (ii) the as-
sumption of custody is necessary to insure the child's appearance
before the court. This limitation contrasts with broad language in
the old law which allowed a police officer to take custody of a child
when he "[found] the child in such surroundings or condition that
he [considered] it necessary [to] take the child into immediate
custody for the child's welfare."4
An amendment enacted during the 1978 Session of the General
Assembly addressed the concern of citizens and law enforcement
personnel that paragraph (B) of section 16.1-246 was too narrowly
drawn. Paragraph (G)46 was added to permit a law enforcement
officer to take custody of a child who has run away or is without
adult supervision at such hours of the night and under such circum-
stances that the officer concludes there is a clear and substantial
danger to the child's welfare. The taking into custody of such a
child, however, does not automatically confer jurisdiction upon the
juvenile court. Moreover, the disposition of the child by law enforce-
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-194(3) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
46. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 643, at 1040.
[Vol. 13:847
JUVENILE COURT LAW REVISION
ment personnel has been strictly limited. In these instances the
officer must notify the juvenile court intake officer to determine if
a petition should be filed on behalf of the child. If not, the child
must be returned home, be released to his parents, be placed in
shelter care for no longer than twenty-four hours pursuant to a
detention order, or be released on his own. Confinement in a deten-
tion home or jail is prohibited.4 1
Other circumstances in which section 16.1-246 permits a child to
be taken into custody include when a detention order or warrant has
been properly issued,48 when an arresting officer observes a child
committing a crime and believes arrest is necessary for the protec-
tion of the public interest,4 9 when there is probable cause to believe
the child has committed a felony,5" or when the child runs away from
a facility or home where he has been placed by the State Board of
Corrections, the court, or a social service agency.' When a child is
taken into custody pursuant to section 16.1-246, the law specifies
the necessary judicial process required to validate that ac-
tion-whether the court is open or closed, who is to be notified, and
with whom or where that child may be placed.2 Restrictions are
placed upon who may issue detention orders53 and warrants5 4 for
children in order to further limit the entanglement of children with
the legal system. A series of amendments enacted by the 1979 Ses-
sion was aimed at clarifying the role of the magistrate in the juvenile
justice system in issuing warrants.5 These statutes help delineate
the responsibilities of law enforcement and juvenile court personnel
in making decisions to take children into custody.
A new section in the law states specific criteria for detaining
children in a detention home or in shelter care, and reflects the
intent of the legislature to mimimize the involvement of children in
the criminal justice system. Section 16.1-248 presumes that the
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-247(I) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-246(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-246(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-246(D) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-246(E) and (F) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-247 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-255 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-256 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
55. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 701 at 1020.
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child should be released after his case is considered by a judge,
intake officer or magistrate and the necessary facts of the case have
been ascertained. Such release shall be to the child's parent or other
suitable person, either on bail or recognizance, or under other appro-
priate conditions.
A child may be detained pursuant to a detention order or warrant,
however, where: (i) the child has no parent or other suitable person
able and willing to provide supervision and care; (ii) the release of
an allegedly delinquent child would constitute an unreasonable
danger to the person or property of others; and (iii) the release would
present a clear and substantial threat of serious harm to the child's
life or health. These criteria are to govern the decisions of all persons
involved in determining whether continued detention or shelter care
is warranted,including decisions made at detention hearings held
pursuant to section 16.1-250. Evidence against releasing the child
must be clear and convincing. These provisions are designed to
reduce the number of children in detention by establishing specific
standards for use by law enforcement officers, court service person-
nel and the judiciary. If it cannot be affirmatively shown that the
child's situation falls within the criteria established, the child
should be released. A child should be deprived of his freedom only
where the state can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he
should be detained.
When it is necessary to detain a child for the specific reasons set
forth in section 16.1-248, the place of confinement must fit the
child's situation. While the public must be protected from the acts
of dangerous youth, the children themselves must be protected from
nonessential and potentially damaging confinement. A new statute
detailing the places of confinement for children attempts to achieve
this balance. Section 16.1-249 permits the placement of any child,
pending a court hearing, in an approved foster home, a facility
licensed by a child welfare agency, or any other suitable place desig-
nated by the court, approved by the Department of Corrections and
not otherwise prohibited by the statute. An abused or neglected
child may not be placed in a detention home or jail.
A child alleged to be in need of services may be detained in a
detention home only for good cause and for a period of up to seventy-
two hours prior to a detention hearing, and may not be placed in
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jail. The original proposal of the revisers to the 1977 session of the
General Assembly provided for no secure detention of children al-
leged to be in need of services. This compromise of a limited deten-
tion of these children is intended to give those communities which
have inadequate, nonsecure shelter facilities available for youth, an
opportunity to develop them. This is the only provision in Virginia's
juvenile court law not in compliance with the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. This federal law prohibits the
confinement of status offenders in juvenile detention or correctional
facilities."6
A delinquent child who is fifteen years of age or older may be
detained in jail under three specified conditions set out in section
16.1-249(B). While the first two conditions are concerned with the
availability of alternative holding facilities and the severity of the
child's alleged offense, the third condition addresses itself to the
distance between the detention home and the place where the child
is taken into custody. If that distance is at least twenty-five miles
and the detention home is in another county or city, the child may
be placed in jail for up to seventy-two hours. This time period was
originally limited to eighteen hours57 but was extended by the 1979
Session. In parts of rural Virginia where detention homes are oper-
ated on a regional basis and are not readily accessible to courts with
limited personnel for transporting children, this expansion of the
jailing of alleged delinquent children was perceived to be necessary.
The law prohibits the transportation of children under the age of
fifteen years in a police patrol wagon, and allows no child to be
transported with adults suspected of or charged with criminal acts. 9
A child who is taken into custody and not released must have a
detention hearing before a judge within seventy-two hours." The
child, if twelve years of age or older, and his parents are entitled to
notice of the hearing. At the time of the hearing the parties must
be informed of the right to counsel, of the contents of the petition,
and of the child's right to remain silent with respect to any allega-
56. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. §5601 et seq
(1976)(amended 1977)).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-248(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
58. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 655, at 946.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-254 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-250 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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tion of delinquency. Hearsay evidence is admissible during the hear-
ing. Amendments to this section during the 1979 Session6' clarified
that a child in need of services, who has been held in a detention
home prior to the detention hearing, shall be released and shall not
be returned to the detention home after the hearing. The judge may
impose certain conditions on the child's behavior, however, pending
adjudication.
The provisions in Virginia's juvenile court law concerning the
taking of children into custody are not directed solely at children
alleged to be delinquent or in need of services. Several provisions in
this article govern abused or neglected children. When the legisla-
ture enacted a comprehensive child abuse and neglect law in 1975,2
general statutory authority was provided for an allegedly abused or
neglected child to be taken into custody for no more than seventy-
two hours by a physician, protective services worker of a local social
services department, or a law enforcement official, subject to certain
conditions .63 To fulfill the intent of this law, and to provide safe-
guards to be observed when a child is taken or is to be taken from
his parents, three new statutes were included in the juvenile court
law. If it is not possible to have a court hearing prior to the removal
of a child from his home, section 16.1-251 provides for an emergency
removal order. Such an order must be followed by an adversary
hearing in order for a preliminary removal order to issue pursuant
to section 16.1-252. If a child requires protection from suspected
abuse or neglect pending final determination of a petition, but can
be left safely in his home with certain limitations, the court can
enter a preliminary protective order under section 16.1-253. These
statutes contain standards establishing the nature of the conduct by
the parents which justifies the removal of the child, and specify the
conditions which may be imposed on the parents to protect the child
from further harm. In these provisions, the revisers sought to strike
a balance between the need to protect children from abuse and
neglect and the purpose of the law to separate a child from his
parents only when the child's welfare is endangered. 4
61. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 338, at 500.
62. Note 24 supra.
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.9 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
64. Note 17 supra.
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E. Article 5-Intake, Petition and Notice
This article of the juvenile court law gives formal status to the
intake process-the receipt of complaints by the court against or on
behalf of children and adults. With certain enumerated excep-
tions," all matters alleged to be in the court's jurisdiction must be
commenced by the filing of a petition. An "intake officer", a posi-
tion now formally recognized in the law,66 is given the specific re-
sponsibility of handling complaints and requests, and the process-
ing of petitions. The Commonwealth's attorney is authorized, how-
ever; to file a petition on his own motion. Complaints alleging abuse
or neglect of a child are referred initially to the local social services
department in accordance with the child abuse and neglect law.6"
In the past, these functions had been handled at various times by
the judge, the clerk of the juvenile court, and the staff of the court
services unit.
In section 16.1-260(B) the intake officer of the court is given the
discretion to deny the filing of petitions where a child is alleged to
be abused, neglected, in need of services, or in certain instances,
delinquent. This provision is intended to avoid the processing and
hearing of frivolous petitions, to encourage diversion where such is
appropriate, and to aid in conserving the court's time. The intake
officer is required to accept a petition in four specified cases," in-
cluding where a complaint alleges that a child has committed a
felony or a Class 1 misdemeanor. The restrictions on the intake
officer's discretion in these four cases were added during the legisla-
tive process and are indicative of the varying confidence which legis-
lators have in the ability of intake officers to perform the semi-
judicial function of determining whether alleged facts amount to
probable cause. When an intake officer refuses to file a petition
against a child for a delinquent offense which the complainant be-
lieves is a felony or Class 1 misdemeanor, 9 the complainant has the
right to appeal to a magistrate for a warrant. If the magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that a felony or Class 1 misdemeanor has
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(E) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(L) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (Rep. Vol. 1975).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
been committed, he may issue a warrant for the child. Pursuant to
the 1979 amendments to this statute, such a warrant must be deliv-
ered forthwith to the juvenile court, and the intake officer must
accept and file a petition founded upon the warrant.7 This appeal
process, which in the original proposal involved the Common-
wealth's attorney in lieu of the magistrate, represents a compromise
as to how the intake officer's decision to deny the filing of a petition
could most efficiently be reviewed.
In order for the intake officer to be free to elicit information from
the child during the intake process, which might enable him to
divert the child, statements made by the child to the officer prior
to a hearing on the petition's merits are inadmissible at any stage
of the proceedings.71
A petition initiates the formal judicial process. Section 16.1-262
specifies the facts which must be contained in a petition to the
juvenile court. Petitions also must include a reference to the law
designating the delinquent act or crime of which the child is accused
and a statement as to whether the child is in custody and the details
thereof. An amendment to this section enacted during the 1979
Session permits the Supreme Court of Virginia to formulate rules
regarding petitions related to custody and support matters, where
the provisions of section 16.1-262 regarding the mandated form and
content of the petition are inappropriate.72 As a result of the juvenile
code revision, a standard form for court petitions is now used
throughout the Commonwealth. The use of this form has assisted
in the gathering of statewide statistical data and the uniformity of
court practice.
The court is required to direct the issuance of summonses to the
persons who are proper or necessary parties to the proceedings. 3 A
copy of the petition must accompany each summons for the initial
hearing. This new requirement is to assure that the parties sum-
monsed to court are fully informed of the charges which have been
brought, or of the issues which are otherwise before the court for
adjudication. Notice of subsequent proceedings must also be pro-
70. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 701, at 1020.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-261 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
72. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 615, at 890.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-263 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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vided to all parties in interest, except in cases where a party is
represented by counsel, and counsel has been provided with a copy
of the petition and due notice as to the time, date and place of the
hearing. In these cases, such action is deemed due notice to the
party, unless counsel has notified the court that he no longer repre-
sents that party. A party, other than the child, may waive service
of summons by a written stipulation or by voluntary appearance at
the hearing.
Traditional service of the summons is provided for in section 16.1-
264. The revisers added to the statute, however, that if after reason-
able effort, a party, other than the person who is the subject of the
petition, cannot be found, or his post office address cannot be ascer-
tained, the court may order service of the summons by order of
publication.74
The authority for the clerk of the juvenile court, and the court on
its own motion, to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and production of records, documents, or
other tangible objects at any hearing is provided for in the newly
added section 16.1-265. 71
F. Article 6-Appointment of Counsel
Substantial rights and responsibilities of children and adults are
involved in proceedings before the juvenile court. Adequate provi-
sion for the appointment of counsel is crucial to maintaining the
integrity of the juvenile court process. The law requires the appoint-
ment of an attorney prior to the hearing of any case involving a child
who is alleged to be abused or neglected, who is the subject of an
entrustment agreement or a petition terminating parental rights, or
whose parents otherwise desire to be relieved of his care and cus-
tody. Counsel for the child cannot be waived in such cases. 7 A child
alleged to be in need of services or delinquent has the right to coun-
sel prior to the adjudicatory or transfer hearing. The child may
employ counsel of his own choice, or, if it is determined that the
child is indigent and the parent does not retain an attorney for the
74. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-316, 8.01-317 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
75. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.25 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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child, the court is required to appoint counsel to represent him. In
cases alleging delinquency or a need of services, the child is also
entitled to waive his right to counsel if the child and his parent
consent in writing and the court finds the interests of the child and
his parent are not adverse.17 The provision for waiver of counsel by
the child is an addition to the law. Also new is a requirement that
the court assess costs, not in excess of seventy-five dollars, against
a parent who is financially able to pay for an attorney appointed by
the court for his child, and who refuses to do so.7
In cases where a parent is charged with abuse or neglect, or is
subject to the loss of residual parental rights and responsibilities for
his child, he is entitled to court appointed counsel, if indigent." As
discussed in the analysis of Article 3-Jurisdiction and Venue, 79 .
the court has been given greater authority over parents of children
before the court. Access to legal representation is just as essential
for the parents as for the child in these cases, a fact which has
been recognized by the revisers. The attorney appointed to repre-
sent a child or adult has a continuing responsibility to provide legal
counsel to his client through all stages of the proceedings unless
relieved or otherwise replaced as provided by law."0
G. Article 7-Transfer and Waiver
Many suggestions were made to the revisers of the juvenile court
law regarding changes in the procedures by which a child is trans-
ferred from juvenile court to circuit court for the adjudication of a
criminal offense. There was a general reluctance, however, to revise
the transfer procedure now found in section 16.1-269. In past years
there has been considerable litigation over the transfer issue, and
the case law is nearly unanimous that failure to comply with the
requirements of the transfer statute is jurisdictional, and that any
such proceeding is void."1 The revisers were concerned that any sub-
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-267 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
79.1. See, supra, subsection C.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-268 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
81. Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.Va. 1969); Mathews v. Commonwealth, 216
Va. 358, 218 S.E.2d 538 (1975); Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 192 S.E.2d 775 (1972);
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stantial revision of this complex statute would result in additional
litigation over its constitutionality.
Some amendments to the procedure, however, were proposed by
the revisers and gained the approval of the legislature. The author-
ity of the juvenile judge to transfer a case on his own motion82 was
repealed, and only the Commonwealth's attorney is now permitted
to make such motions. Excluding the judge from initiating the
transfer proceedings gives the Commonwealth's attorney an oppor-
tunity to weigh the chances of a successful prosecution in adult
court, and tends to prevent transfers for serious offenses from be-
coming routine with some juvenile judges. In deciding whether to
transfer a case, the court is permitted under the revised law, to
consider the nature of the present offense as a single criterion of the
amenability of the child to treatment or rehabilitation separate
from such factors as the child's prior delinquency record and the
nature of past treatment efforts. The statute permits certification
to the circuit court without a finding of amenability in cases of
armed robbery or murder, and in certain cases of forcible rape.
Efforts during the 1979 session of the legislature to further relax the
requirements for transferring children to the circuit court, or other-
wise treat them as adults for the alleged commitment of criminal
offenses, were not successful.3
Concern was expressed to the revisers that the circuit court had
insufficient time after the receipt of a case from the juvenile court
to consider whether or not to remand the case or advise the Com-
monwealth's attorney that he may seek an indictment. Therefore,
the transfer procedure was amended to increase from ten to twenty-
one days the length of time that the circuit court has to enter an
order relating to transferred cases.
An amendment to section 16.1-269 during the 1979 session re-
quires that the juvenile court set bail for a child after the completion
of a hearing on the issue of whether to transfer the child to the
circuit court.84 This new requirement is to prevent a child from
Gogley v. Peyton, 208 Va. 679, 160 S.E.2d 746 (1968); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d
739 (1966).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
83. S.B. 788, 789, 790, 791, Va. General Assembly (1979).
84. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 384, at 566.
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improperly languishing in detention prior to consideration of his
case by the circuit court.
A new provision in the law makes clear that the trial or treatment
of a child as an adult shall not preclude the juvenile court from
taking jurisdiction of the child for the commission of subsequent
offenses.Y
What power does the circuit court have over a juvenile offender
who has been properly transferred or who has waived jurisdiction"
to that court? Section 16.1-272 states that authority. A child has a
right to trial by jury in the circuit court on the issue of guilt or
innocence. Upon a finding of guilty, however, the court, and not the
jury, sentences the juvenile in accordance with state criminal laws
or with the laws prescribed for the disposition of cases in juvenile
court. This provision for jury verdicts and judge sentencing in juve-
nile cases is contrary to that used in the adult system in Virginia.
The revisers saw that the problems peculiar to juvenile cases de-
mand the expertise of the judge in sentencing and commitment. The
inability of juries to adequately comprehend the differences in the
sentencing of a juvenile defendant as an adult, and the treatment
of that same child within the framework of the juvenile court laws,
were thought to justify a sentencing procedure which varies from
adult cases. When the circuit court decides to treat the juvenile
offender as a child and places him on probation, provision is made
for supervision by juvenile probation officers.87
H. Article 8-Adjudication
After the case of a child has been adjudicated, the court may
require, before final disposition of the case, a report on the physical,
mental and social conditions, and personality of the child, and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the violation of law.88 To pro-
tect the confidentiality of these social histories, the revisers pro-
vided that attorneys may not make copies of the investigations fur-
nished them by the court clerk. 9
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-271 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-270 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-273 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-274 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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A valuable resource for the court in making appropriate disposi-
tions of children is found in section 16.1-275. This statute authorizes
physical and mental examinations of children who are before the
court and provides a mechanism for the payment of such care and
treatment. In order to protect children from unwarranted stays in
state mental hospitals under this statute, such placements for the
purpose of obtaining a recommendation for treatment are limited to
thirty days. Amendments to the statute during 1978 prohibit the
detention or care of children in state hospitals, pursuant to this
section, in any maximum security units where adults determined to
be criminally insane reside. Children are required to be kept sepa-
rate and apart from such adults."0
Standards for determining whether or not the court should ap-
prove entrustment agreements over which it has new jurisdictional
authority are set forth in section 16.1-277. The findings required to
be made by the court before approval include: (i) whether suitable
alternative placements exist for the child; (ii) whether the child
needs an alternative placement; and (iii) whether a transfer of legal
custody and placement outside the child's present home would not
detrimentally affect the child's life, health or development. Consis-
tent with the purpose and intent of the juvenile court law, the fam-
ily unit should be preserved and supported whenever this is practic-
able and possible. A child should have a stable environment in
which to grow up. When a child is removed from his home either
with or without his parent's consent for longer than a ninety-day
period, his case should be reviewed by the court. The revisers found
many instances in which children are entrusted to local social serv-
ice departments, and are caught up in the foster care cycle for many
years. Sometimes the condition that precipitates the entrustment
and the child's entry into foster care is removed, but the child fails
to return home. The parents may not want the child back, or they'
may believe that the child has been taken from them permanently.
Sometimes agencies are not aware of the changed conditions either
because the child has no caseworker at the time, or because heavy
caseloads make it difficult to keep track of what is happening to a
particular child and his parents. Many children who are the subject
90. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 739, at 1224.
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of entrustment agreements could be cared for in their homes if
homemaker or day care services are made available or used. Court
review of these agreements is intended to insure that all of these
factors are considered and that the rights of the child and his par-
ents are protected.
I. Article 9-Disposition
The juvenile court is given tremendous responsibility for the care,
protection and assistance of children and families within its juris-
diction. It also has the duty to serve the community as a whole and
protect its citizens from dangerous youth. The resources and sanc-
tions available to the juvenile court to perform the3e functions are
specified in this article.
While a comparable statute prior to 1977 required public officials
and agencies to "render such assistance and cooperation to the court
as will best further the object of this law,"9 section 16.1-278 in the
new law is more emphatic. It states in pertinent part:
The judge may order, after notice and opportunity to be heard, any
State, county or municipal officer or employee or any govermental
institution to render only such information, assistance, services, and
cooperation as may be provided for by State or federal law or any
ordinance of any city, county or town."
Even though the statute's wording is somewhat cumbersome-due
to repeated redrafting of the section during the legislative pro-
cess-its purpose remains clear. In order for the court to effectively
dispose of the cases before it, and assist the parties subject to its
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to require that services man-
dated by law be delivered by the responsible public employee or
governmental agency. Where the assistance of an officer or em-
ployee is required on behalf of a person before the court, he may not
hide behind the shield of insufficient time, inadequate staff, or lack
of funds to provide services which are mandated by law. The tradi-
tional authority to cooperate with and make use of the services of
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-156 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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other public and private organizations and societies is also provided
to the court. 3
This expanded authority in the juvenile court over public agen-
cies and employees is also to assist in effective disposition of peti-
tions filed by or on behalf of a child or his parents to obtain treat-
ment, rehabilitation or other services required by law-a new sub-
ject of the court's jurisdiction. 4 This new authority and responsibil-
ity recognizes the validity of the concept of the "right to treatment."
With regard to the child who is subjected to the restraints of the
juvenile justice system,
the state, through its juvenile courts, must demonstrate that it is
conscientiously striving to achieve the rehabilitation it promises, and
that (though it makes no promise to actually bring about the reforma-
tion of the child) it will seek to employ the best institutional, proba-
tionary, medical, psychiatric, and other techniques in providing for
each child to develop into a mature and law-abiding citizen. 5
For the family which needs the assistance of local, state, or federally
mandated programs, the court also has the duty to be the family's
advocate and to attempt to make these services responsive to the
citizens who require that aid. As the juvenile court in Virginia be-
gins to more fully realize its potential for positively influencing the
lives of the children and families in the community it serves, the
value of this yet little utilized authority in section 16.1-278 will be
realized.
The disposition statute has been restructured to parallel the juris-
diction section of the new law, and the more clearly defined catego-
ries of children subject to the court. For each object of the court's
jurisdiction found in section 16.1-241, an appropriate dispositional
alternative is set forth in section 16.1-279. Paragraphs (A), (C), and
(E) set out the alternative court orders available for children found
to be abused or neglected, children adjudicated in need of services
or those found to be delinquent, respectively.
93. VA. CODE AN. § 16.1-278(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(G) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
95. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Courts, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
97, 101 (1961). See also Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment, 6 FAMILY L. Q.
279 (1972).
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The judge may enter an order pursuant to section 16.1-278, as
previously discussed, for the benefit of all three definitional catego-
ries of children. 6 In keeping with the court's new jurisdictional au-
thority over parents, a child who has been abused or neglected, and
who has been removed from his home, may be returned to his par-
ents subject to such conditions and limitations as the court may
order with respect to the child and his parents. Legal custody of the
child, however, may be transferred to an approved individual or
agency, while the parents are ordered to participate in prescribed
services or to refrain from certain conduct. The residual parental
rights and responsibilities of the parents may also be terminated. 7
When the court finds a child, who is fourteen years of age or older,
to be in need of services and unable to benefit from further schooling
after diligent efforts by school officials to meet the child's educa-
tional needs, the court may excuse the child from attending school
and authorize the child to work pursuant to a work permit." This
provision is designed for the child who is habitually truant from
school, who is disruptive in the classroom and on school grounds,
and for whom all alternative educational programs have failed.
Paragraph (D) of section 16.1-279 states: "Unless a child found
to be abused, neglected or in need of services shall also be found to
be delinquent and shall be older than ten years of age, he shall not
be committed to the State Board of Corrections." Prior to the new
law, there was no minimum age for the commitment of children to
the State Board. A minimum age of thirteen years for commitment
was recommended by several groups which appeared before the re-
visers, and was given serious consideration. However, because of the
current lack of alternative facilities for dealing with the seriously
disturbed and potentially dangerous young child, in both the correc-
tions and mental health fields, the minimum age was set at ten
years.
The issue of whether a child in need of services should, under any
circumstances, be committed to the State Board of Corrections was
widely debated in the public hearings held by the Subcommittee on
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(A)(1), (C)(1) and (E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(A)(2), (A)(4) and (A)(5) (Cure. Supp. 1979).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(C)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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Juvenile Code Revision and among the revisers themselves. The
report of the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council on Juvenile Code
Revision stated:
The Council supports the noncommitment of children in need of
services on the basis that children involved in unacceptable, but
noncriminal behavior, receive greater benefit from noncoercive, reha-
bilitative social services such as family counseling, youth service bur-
eaus, health agencies, educational and employment opportunities
and other forms of community treatment. The underlying philosophy
of the juvenile court is that rehabilitative service, not punishment,
should be provided nonconforming children to help them become
law-abiding and productive citizens. Incarceration in a State institu-
tion of the truant, the runaway and the child who is beyond the
control of his parents serves no humanitarian or rehabilitative pur-
pose. It is unwarranted punishment and unjust because it is dispro-
portionate to the harm done by the child's noncriminal behavior.
The Council believes that the power of the juvenile court to commit
children to State penal institutions where indeterminate sentences
are served must be limited to criminal behavior that threatens the
community. The problems of the child in need of services are in the
home, the school and the community at large, and that is where they
need to be resolved.
The thrust of this major recommendation by the Council and of
many of the supporting proposals is that children in need of services
need to be diverted out of the juvenile justice system and into nonin-
stitutional programs which are better equipped to handle them. The
success of this diversion and of many other provisions being recom-
mended in this report depends upon the development of new group
homes and "attention homes" instead of detention homes. The
schools must provide viable programs to teach the poorly motivated,
educationally handicapped and culturally deprived child and learn
to keep in tow the unruly youngster instead of pushing him out of
school. Alternative educational programs must be developed.
Community-based programs which provide treatment, educational
opportunities and residential alternatives are essential to effectuate
diversion from the court system and genuine rehabilitation of the
unacceptable behavior of children before the court."
99. Note 15 supra, at 12, 13.
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In cases where a child is adjudicated delinquent and the court has
jurisdiction over the parents for having contributed. to the child's
misconduct, the court may order the parent "to participate in such
programs, to cooperate in such treatment or be subject to such
conditions and limitations as the court may order and as are de-
signed for the rehabilitation of the child and parent" to facilitate
the rehabilitation of the child."' An identical dispositional alterna-
tive for children in need of services was made available to the court
by an amendment enacted during the 1979 session of the General
Assembly. 10
Traffic violations and infractions committed by juveniles are
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The disposition statute
in section 16.1-279 (E) (8) limits the penalties which may be im-
posed for such offenses to those penalties authorized to be imposed
on adults. A proposal by the Subcommittee on Juvenile Code Revi-
sion to transfer jurisdiction of traffic cases to the general district
court was rejected by the legislature.
A 1978 amendment to the disposition section authorizes juvenile
courts, in cases involving offenses committed by one spouse against
another, to impose conditions and limitations in an effort to effect
the reconciliation and rehabilitation of the parties. This includes
treatment and counseling for either or both spouses, and payment
by the defendant spouse for crisis shelter care for the complaining
spouse.102 Efforts by members of the legislature in 19,79 to authorize
additional resources for the juvenile court to dispose of spouse abuse
cases were unsuccessful.'03
Two other amendments to the 1977 revision of the disposition
statute are noteworthy. Both were considered by the legislature in
the 1978 and 1979 sessions before the controversy surrounding their
enactment was resolved. The first amendment involves the question
of who has the final authority to determine the appropriate place-
ment of a child who is committed by the court to the custody of the
local board of social services: the board or the judge. The legislature
100. VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
101. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 702, at 1024.
102. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 756, at 1269.
103. H.B. 1946, 1979 Va. General Assembly.
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resolved this issue in favor of the local board."0 4 The second amend-
ment concerns the authority of the courts to order joint commit-
ments of children to the State Board of Corrections and a local
welfare board, or to transfer custody of children jointly to juvenile
court services units and local welfare boards. The legislature deter-
mined that such orders should be prohibited' 5 because of the danger
that a child for whom two agencies are responsible may become no
one's responsibility. Access to funding for the care of certain chil-
dren, which had previously been limited only to social service place-
ments, is now more universally available pursuant to a legislative
study conducted in this area.' 6 The necessity for such orders has,
therefore, been generally eliminated.
Three new provisions have been added to Article 9 relating to
foster care and the termination of parental rights. Placement of
children with the local social services department and, therefore, in
foster care, is a dispositional alternative available to the juvenile
court. 01 In June, 1978 there were 10,199 children in foster care in
Virginia, "0I and approximately 4,000 new children are placed in the
program every year. Although foster care is intended to be tempo-
rary, many children will spend the years to maturation in foster
care, without the benefits of the permanency, stability, and conti-
nuity in life which are essential to normal development. Returning
foster care children to their natural homes or providing a permanent
home through adoption to break the foster care cycle has been the
exception rather than the-rule. To insure that foster children are not
lost and forgotten by the system that is responsible for their welfare,
the legislature recognized that there must be a periodic review of
their status and of the steps being taken to find permanent homes
for them.
To effectuate this review process, section 16.1-281 requires that
goals be established for the child placed in foster care and his fam-
ily, and a service plan must be developed to assure that the goals
104. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 695, at 1004.
105. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 696, at 1008.
106. REPORT OF THE JOINT SuBcoinTEE ON THE MEDICAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN, H. Doc. No.
28 (1979).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
108. A Foster Care Review, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Welfare to the 1979
Session of the Virginia General Assembly (1977-78).
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will be achieved. The agency which places the child is required to
prepare the foster care plan in consultation with the child, the
child's parents, and any other person standing in loco parentis at
the time the agency obtained custody. The plan describes, among
other things, the services and support to be offered the child and
parents, the participation and conduct which will be sought from
the parents, the visitation to be permitted between the child and his
parents, and the nature of the placements to be provided for the
child. The plan must be designed to return the child home, or to
place him in an adoptive home or in permanent foster care place-
ment. Such a foster care plan, keyed to the individual circumstan-
ces of each child and family, lays the foundation for later review of
the child's status by the court. The juvenile court, pursuant to
section 16.1-282, is required to review the case of every child in foster
care who has not been placed in an adoptive home or permanent
foster care placement twelve months after the filing of a foster care
plan with the court. The intent of the foster care plan and of judicial
review is to return the child to a stable home environment as soon
as practicable, whether it be to his natural home, an adoptive home,
or a permanent foster care placement. The court places the child in
foster care and must become more involved with what happens to
that child thereafter.
Amendments to section 63.1-195 and a new section 63.1-206.1 set
up a new program for permanent foster care placements.' 9 Such
placements are made only by court order and are intended to pro-
vide an alternative to temporary foster care and its attendant insta-
bility for children and foster parents, and an alternative to adoption
where the rights of the natural parents are terminated.
Section 16.1-283, allowing termination of the residual parental
rights, is an important correlative provision to the previously dis-
cussed foster care sections. The old law lacked detailed procedures
or clear guidelines for the termination of parental rights. The intent
of this new section is to provide such procedures and guidelines and
to protect the right of the parent to the custody of his child, as well
as to protect the right of the child to a stable home environment.
While some flexibility is needed in dealing with individual cases of
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-195, 63.1-206.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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neglect, abuse, entrustment or abandonment of children and any
consequent termination of residual parental rights and responsibili-
ties, evidence of certain conditions in the natural home can provide
guidance for such decisions. Where parents suffer long-term mental
or emotional illness, addiction to alcohol, narcotics or other danger-
ous drugs, willfully refuse to cooperate in future planning for the
child, or fail to maintain contact with the child, without good cause,
for specified periods of time, and fail to make reasonable progress
towards eliminating the conditions which led to their child's foster
care placement, serious consideration should be given to terminat-
ing their rights to the child. Depending upon the conditions which
led to the child's placement in foster care, and upon the actions of
the parents, provision is made for the commencement of termina-
tion proceedings within six to twelve months.
Several groups appearing before the Subcommittee on Juvenile
Code Revision at its public hearings requested that the procedure
for review of foster care cases be an administrative one within the
State Department of Welfare. Serious consideration was given to
this suggestion. It was concluded, however, that since the provisions
for foster care plans, foster care review, permanent foster care place-
ments, and termination of residual parental rights all deal with
substantial legal rights and responsibilities of the parent and child,
these programs and procedures must be judicially administered to
be effective and to protect all the parties involved.
In section 16.1-284 the court retains the ability to sentence a child
fifteen years of age or older to jail when he is found guilty of the
commission of a misdemeanor or a felony. The revisers added to the
statute findings which the court must make after the receipt of a
social history and before the imposition of such a penalty. They
include: (i) the child must not be amenable to treatment as a juve-
nile through available facilities; and (ii) the interests of the com-
munity must require that the child be placed under legal restraint
or discipline. A child may be sentenced to jail for no longer than
twelve months for single or multiple offenses and may not be con-
fined for a misdemenor for a longer period of time than would be
authorized for an adult."0
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
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While commitments of children pursuant to the juvenile court law
are for an indeterminant period up to the child's tweniy-first birth-
day, children who are committed as abused, neglected or in need of
services have the right upon request to be released at the age of
eighteen years."' Flexibility for these categories of children was left
in the law to protect their eligibility for financial resources, which
may be made available to them through social service programs.
Since the court's option to commit children in need of services to
the State Board of Corrections 2 was removed, a mechanism to
provide for alternative nonsecure placements was needed. Section
16.1-286, proposed by the Subcommittee on Juvenile.Code Revision
and enacted a year before the comprehensive revision of 1977, was
designed to fill this gap. This statute authorizes the court to place
a child in an approved private or locally operated public facility
when it determines that the behavior of a child cannot be dealt with
in the child's own locality. If the placement is made pursuant to
procedures established by the State Board of Corrections, the cost
is paid by the state. The court is required to review these place-
ments annually, and a roster of the whereabouts of all children
placed under this provision must be maintained by the Director of
Corrections. The ability to use state funds to finance private and
local residential placements of children before the court should as-
sist in the deinstitutionalization of status offenders.
The authority of the juvenile court to review commitments of
children to the Board of Corrections and modify or revoke its orders
was reviewed by the revisers. Discontent with the treatment of some
juveniles in the corrections system led to suggestions that the court
be permitted to reopen any case of commitment at any time. The
revisers were unwilling to adopt this recommendation, but did agree
to increase the length of time the court has to review an order of
commitment to the state corrections agency from thirty to sixty
days."3
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
112. 1976 Va. Acts, ch. 464, at 540.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-289 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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J. Article 10-Probation and Parole
A proceeding to revoke probations, protective supervision, or pa-
role must be commenced by the filing of a petition and is governed
by the safeguards, rights, and duties applicable to the original pro-
ceedings."4 A new provision in the law specifies that any person who
violates a court order may be proceeded against by a show cause
order, contempt of court, or both. The court is limited, however,
with respect to a child who violates a court order to those actions
which it could have taken at the time of the court's original disposi-
tion of the case."' This limitation on the court's power is to prevent
children in need of services from being committed to the State
Board of Corrections or to other secure detention facilities for viola-
tion of probation, when such dispositions are permissible pursuant
to section 16.1-279.
When a delinquent child has been committed to the state correc-
tions agency and is returned to the community for supervision, who
is responsible for supervising him and for determining the terms and
conditions of the supervision? The new law requires the director of
the Department of Corrections to consult with the local juvenile
court regarding the return of the child. The juvenile court then
determines whether the juvenile court service unit or the local social
services department will supervise the child. Thie court also deter-
mines what the terms and conditions of supervision will be. When
a person has been placed on probation and is being supervised in
one locality, and thereafter moves his residence to another locality,
transfer of supervision may be arranged by the juvenile court of the
locality from which the person moves or by the transferring court,
rather than by the director of the Department of Corrections."'
K. Article 11-Appeal
The procedure which governs appeals of final orders and judg-
ments of the juvenile court is in accordance with the procdure for
the appeal of criminal matters from the general district court."7
Where an appeal is taken by a child on a finding of delinquency,
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-292 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-295 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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trial by jury on the issue of guilt or innocence may be had on a
motion by the child, the Commonwealth's attorney, or the circuit
judge. If the jury should find the child guilty, the judge would deter-
mine disposition.15
An appeal in a nondelinquency matter will be heard in the circuit
court according to the equity practice where the evidence is heard
ore tenus, although, on the motion of any party, an issue out of
chancery may be heard in the discretion of the judge.
Pending appeal, judgments of the juvenile court are suspended in
certain cases including, among others, those involving delinquency
in which the court orders the child to pay a fine, make restitution
or reparation, be committed to the State Board of Corrections, or
serve a jail sentence. All four of these provisions were added to the
law in 1977. In nondelinquency matters, an appeal will generally not
operate to suspend any judgment, order or decree without a specific
order doing so. In all cases where the order of the juvenile court is
suspended, bail may be required."9
L. Article 12-Confidentiality and Expungement
A significant new addition to the law is found in section 16.1-295
concerning the fingerprinting and photographing of children taken
into custody. An attorney representing a juvenile client should be
aware of the limitations in the law as to when a child may be finger-
printed, or photographed, or both, and when these records must be
subsequently destroyed. In this section and in succeeding provisions
dealing with law enforcement records, 2 ' juvenile and circuit court
records,'21 and the expungement of certain documents,'22 the revisers
sought to strike a balance between the need for investigative tools
on the part of law enforcement officials, and the right of the child
and family to privacy.
If the benevolent and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court
118. The rationale for this new procedure of jury verdicts and judge sentencing in juvenile
cases was discussed supra in the analysis of Article 7-Transfer and Waiver. See subsection
G.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-298 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-305 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-306 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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are actually to be served, the revisers recognized that provision must
be made for the expungement of court and arrest records. Such
records can handicap the child who has been before the court as a
delinquent or status offender for years to come. While the prior law
made destruction of juvenile court records discretionary with the
judge, 123the new law makes mandatory the destruction of all records
concerning a child found to be delinquent or in need of services,
when such child becomes nineteen years of age and five years have
elapsed since the last proceeding was disposed of by the courts.
Such expungement does not apply to children found guilty of felon-
ies. The remainder of the records are subject to being sealed and,
under certain circumstances, later being destroyed.
An amendment to this statute during the 1979 session of legisla-
ture 24 provides that a person who has been the subject of a delin-
quency petition, which does not allege the commission of a felony
and (i) who has been found innocent thereof, or (ii) the petition has
otherwise been dismissed, may file a motion requesting the destruc-
tion of all records pertaining to the delinquency charge. This ena-
bles the person's records to be expunged immediately rather than
after the otherwise necessary time period. 125 The law directs the
court to notify persons of their rights under section 16.1-306 at the
time of their dispositional hearing.
What is the penalty for violating the confidentiality requirements
of the juvenile court law? Section 16.1-309 provides for the first time
that such action shall be deemed a Class 3 misdemeanor, for which
a fine of not more than five hundred dollars may be assessed. 126
During the 1979 session of the General Assembly, a new section
was added to the law which exempts judges from the confidentiality
and penalty provisions of this article in certain situations. 12 Where
consideration of the public interest requires it, the judge is permit-
ted to make public the name and address of a child, and the nature
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-193 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
124. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 737, at 1166.
125. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (expungement of criminal records
requires that a petition be filed with the court to which the Commonwealth's attorney may
file an answer or objection within twenty-one days).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
127. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 94, at 131.
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of the offense for which he has been adjudicated delinquent if the
act would be classified as a Class 1, 2 or 3 felony if committed by
an adult.' In the law operative prior to 1977, the judge had the
authority to make public the name of the juvenile, the names of his
parents, and the nature of his offense, if the judge deemed it to be
in the public interest.'29 The Subcommittee on Juvenile Code Revi-
sion recommended repealing such authority, and this was subse-
quently done by the 1977 session of the legislature. The restoration
of a limited authority to disclose the names of juveniles was the
result of a continuing controversy between the rights of citizens to
be informed about the perpetrators of criminal offenses in their
community and the freedom of the press to release that information,
and the state's interest in protecting privacy and the rehabilitative
nature of the juvenile court process.
IL. CONCLUSION
The revision of the juvenile code followed many public hearings
and visits to the public institutions that serve children across Vir-
ginia. This legislative effort which began in 1974, reflects the
aroused concern of members of the General Assembly about the
quality of care and justice received by children in Virginia. The
legislation, as finally approved in 1977, was the result of considera-
ble compromise, and its evolution is continuing, as evidenced by
amendments to it during the 1978 and 1979 sessions of the General
Assembly. It is not a perfect law, but is does represent a significant
beginning toward meaningful change in the treatment of children
by state and local agencies.
The growing concern across the nation for the large number of
children who remain in state care until they reach adulthood,
caused the revisers to venture into new areas of statutory reform to
assure that children not remain in foster care when a permanent
living arrangement is possible. The decision to inject the courts into
the foster care process by requiring the filing of foster care plans and
judicial review of those plans was not intended as an indictment of
social services agencies. Rather, it was an attempt by the General
Assembly to give foster care workers a greater opportunity to suc-
128 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-162 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
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ceed, by vesting the courts with the authority to order services,
outside the realm of welfare programs, as a means of augmenting
proposed foster care plans.
Legislators were alarmed over the substantial number of inappro-
priate commitments of children to the State Board of Corrections
for care and treatment. Too often the placement of a child depended
upon the availability of public funds, while appropriate treatment
in the proper facility was a secondary consideration. In 1975, the
Department of Corrections reported that forty-eight percent of the
children held in secure state correctional facilities were either re-
tarded or emotionally disturbed. One-third of the juvenile correc-
tional population consisted of children who had committed no of-
fense for which they could have been jailed had they been adults. 3 '
They were status offenders-truants, runaways, and incorrigibles.
State mental hospitals were reluctant to accept these children,
primarily because these institutions were not staffed or programmed
to deal with an adolescent population separate from adult or crimi-
nal patients. The sad truth was that while state and local govern-
ments paid lip service to the need for mental health treatment facil-
ities for children and adolescents, very little had been accomplished
to provide the necessary services. Social service and court service
personnel became increasingly frustrated in their efforts to locate
appropriate treatment for children who lacked the financial re-
sources to be treated in the private sector. As the level of frustration
grew, the criminal justice system became the dumping ground for
these difficult children. While the state mental hospitals could re-
fuse to accept certain of these children, the Department of Correc-
tions could not, nothwithstanding the fact that it offered marginal
mental health services, if any. The study that preceded the passage
of this legislation clearly revealed the folly of attempting to address
the weaknesses in the old juvenile statutes without considering the
complex reasons why children remained in foster care, or why they
were inappropriately placed in state institutions.
When the legislature began its inquiry into the quality of foster
care programs and the level of services provided juveniles in state
130. Characteristics of Children Committed in 1974 as Assessed by the Mobile Psychiatric
Unit, Program Evaluation Unit, Division of Youth Services, Department of Corrections (July,
1975).
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correctional facilities and state mental hospitals, it was dismayed
to find vast disparities between what was believed to be available
and what was actually provided by the state. The lack of appropri-
ate facilities in the Commonwealth, and the failure to utilize exist-
ing programs, resulted in hundreds of children being sent to thirty-
one states at a cost of more than five million dollars. in 1975.131 Once
these children were sent away, there was little monitoring of their
treatment and progress. One of the most difficult facts to accept was
the reality that many children who come into the criminal justice
system are there because they are unwanted and unloved. Often,
their families have given up trying to cope with them and prefer to
have them incarcerated, whether they have committed a criminal
offense or not. If the state should accept responsibility for a child,
it must not be allowed to do worse by that child than his family has
done.
During the deliberations which occurred in the years between
1974 and the passage of comprehensive legislation in 1977, many of
the deficiencies discovered in Virginia's juvenile justice system were
improved by administrative order as well as by complementary leg-
islative action. These efforts have, in the opinion of the authors of
this article, resulted in much progress in the treatment of children
by the criminal justice system, and in the social service and mental
health systems of Virginia. A concerted effort has been made to
bring consistency and balance to the juvenile court system of the
post-Gault era. The legislature has not been obsessed with legal
procedure, however, to the exclusion of concern for improving the
care, treatment and rehabilitation of parties before the court. In the
final analysis, the quality of justice administered by the juvenile
courts of the Commonwealth must be measured by both the due
process which characterizes their proceedings, and the value of the
treatment which they supply. Continuing legislative reform of Vir-
ginia's juvenile court statutes and of supporting human service pro-
grams will be necessary as state and local governments seek to fulfill
the responsibilities placed in them by the citizens they represent.
131. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, H. Doc. No. 16 (1977).
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